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1 Introduction
In Hild (2001a, 2001b), we have shown that both the ex post and robust mode of prefer-
ence aggregation are not stable under refinements of the individuals’ decision–theoretic
models. The present report states and proves these results in a framework that does
not presuppose the separation of states and consequences. We will use Fishburn’s (1964,
1970) framework that contains only the minimal elements of any type of decision theory.1
Fishburn starts with two primitives, consequences C ∈ P and acts f ∈ F . Consequences
are evaluated by a utility function; acts induce belief measures Pf over consequences.
Acts, thus, occur only as indices of the belief measures which they induce and their
underlying structure (e.g., as functions from worlds to consequences) is not considered.
Example Savage. In Savage’s framework, Fishburn’s probability measures Pf (for
f ∈ F) are induced by some common probability measure over a set Ω of ‘states of
the world’. Acts are identified with functions f : Ω → Γ from states of the world to
consequences. Hence, Pf (c) := P (f
−1(c)) for all c ∈ Γ.
The results of this report apply to the same utility aggregation rules and robust
aggregation rules as our previous results but they cover only a smaller class of decision
theories. The present results do not cover ordinal theories (e.g., decision–theoretic leximin
or leximax) or any other theory based on binary evaluations. In theories of this type, we
cannot infer nullness of a belief measure from preferences without making use of a state–
consequence separation. More importantly, theories like Loomes/Sugden’s (1982) regret
theory presuppose Savage’s representation of acts as functions from states to consequences
and are thus incompatible with the present framework. The results of this report do,
however, cover the following decision theories:
∗Address for correspondence: California Institute of Technology, Mailcode 228–77, Pasadena, CA
91125 (USA). Email: matthias@hild.org. Website: http://www.hild.org.
1We note that, in Fishburn’s framework, the separation of individual probabilities and utilities on
the basis of preferences requires external randomization (roulette–lotteries; cf. Balch/Fishburn, 1974)
or similar means.
• expected utility.
• expected utility with threshold (Fishburn, 1988).
• Choquet–expected utility (Gilboa, 1987, Schmeidler, 1989).
• probability transforms (Edwards, 1955, Kahneman/Tversky, 1979, Karmarkar, 1978).
• weighted utility theory (Chew 1983, Fishburn, 1983).
• Machina (1982).
The reader may consult the end of Section 2 for details.
2 Ex Post Aggregation
Generalized decision theory
Choose a frame of reference Γ for consequences and a frame of reference Φ for acts.
We assume that Γ is at least countably infinite and that Φ has at least two elements.
Throughout, we will only construct models with a finite number of consequences. We
say that P is a Γ–partition if and only if P is a finite collection of non–empty and
mutually disjoint sets the union of which is Γ. Acts will now induce belief measures for
the consequences in the set P . Instead of using belief measures on the power set of P ,
we choose a more economical but equivalent approach and use belief measures on [P ] :=
{⋃X|X ⊆ P}. The set [P ] contains all events expressible in P . As far as decision theory
is concerned, we will assume that individual models use a monadic decision rule, are non–
trivial, invariant under empty refinements and one–refinable in a sense to be defined.
We will require any ex post social choice rule to evaluate consequences by aggregating
individual utilities, to rank actions based on its evaluation of their consequences and to
prefer absolutely dominant acts.
For some fixed L ∈ N+, we say that u is a utility on P if and only if u : P → RL. We
admit multi-dimensional utilities in order to include models like those of Machina (1983)
(cf. applications). Let u be the set of all u such that there exists some Γ–partition P
on which u is a utility. For any Γ–partition P , we define u(P) as the set of all utilities
on P . For 〈al〉, 〈bl〉 ∈ RL, we write 〈al〉 ≥ 〈bl〉 :iff al ≥ bl for all 1 ≤ l ≤ L; we write
〈al〉 = 〈bl〉 :iff al = bl for all 1 ≤ l ≤ L; we write 〈al〉 > 〈bl〉 :iff al > bl for all 1 ≤ l ≤ L.
For any Γ–partitions P and P ′ and any mapping φ : P → [P ′], we define the extended
mapping φ¯ : [P ] → [P ′] by φ¯(A) := ⋃{φ(C)|C ∈ P , C ⊆ A} for all A ∈ [P ]. We say
that p is a belief type if and only if (a) for every p ∈ p there is some Γ–partition with
p : [P ]→ R,2 (b) for every Γ–partition there is a p ∈ p with domain [P ], and (c) for all
2Again, the use of the real numbers as a scale is not essential.
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Γ–partitions P , P ′, every 1–1 mapping φ : P ′ → P and every p with domain [P ]: if p ∈ p,
then p ◦ φ¯ ∈ p. We refer to property (c) by saying that p is closed under relabelling. For
any Γ–partition P , we define p(P) as the set of all p ∈ p with p : [P ]→ R. We call any
p ∈ p(P) a (p–)belief measure on P . Suppose we have Γ–partitions P , P ′ with P ⊆ [P ′]
and p ∈ p(P), p′ ∈ p(P ′). We then say that p′ refines p if and only if p(A) = p′(A) for
all A ∈ [P ].3
We embody into our the concept of a decision rule a non–triviality condition and the
requirement to yield identical results if consequences are refined in a way that does not
affect any utilities. For any belief type p, G is a decision rule for p if and only if (a) G
is a function such that, for any Γ–partition P , any p ∈ p(P) and any u ∈ u(P), G maps
〈p, u〉 into R, (b) for every Γ–partition P and every p ∈ p(P) there are u, u′ ∈ u(P)
such that G(p, u) > G(p, u′) and (c) for any Γ–partitions P and P ′ with P ⊆ [P ′], any
p ∈ p(P), p′ ∈ p(P ′), u ∈ u(P) and u′ ∈ u(P ′), if p′ refines p and u(C) = u′(X) for
all C ∈ P and all X ∈ P ′ with X ⊆ C, then G(p, u) = G(p′, u′). We refer to property
(b) by saying that G is non–trivial and to property (c) by saying that G is invariant
under empty refinements. We define a set of consequences to be null relative to a belief
measure p and a decision rule G exactly when the utility assignments to the consequences
in the set make no difference for the value of G(p, u). For any Γ–partition P , any belief
type p, any decision rule G for p, any p ∈ p(P) and any A ∈ [P ], we say that A is
p,G–null if and only if, for all u, u′ ∈ u(P): If u(C) = u′(C) for all C ∈ P with C ⊆ −A,
then G(p, u) = G(p, u′). Any A ∈ [P ] is p,G–one if and only if −A is p,G–null (cf.
Observation A.1).
M = 〈P , u,F ,p, P,G〉 is a (generalized) decision–theoretic model if and only if P is a
Γ–partition, u is a utility on P , F ⊆ Φ, p is a belief type, P is a function P : F → p(P),
and G is a decision rule for p. We define PM , uM , FM , pM , PM and GM to be the entities
such that M = 〈PM , uM ,FM ,pM , PM , GM〉. We write PM,f := PM(f) (for all f ∈ FM).
The function VM : FM → R defined by VM(f) := GM(uM , PM,f ) (for all f ∈ FM) is the
evaluation function associated with M .
Let I ≥ 2 (I ∈ N) be the fixed number of individuals. Let G(I) be the set of all
vectors 〈Mi〉 of decision–theoretic models such that PMi = PMj , FMi = FMj (for all
1 ≤ i, j ≤ I). For any 〈Mi〉 ∈ G(I), let P〈Mi〉 := PM1 and F〈Mi〉 := FM1 . This definition
allows the models in a vector 〈Mi〉 ∈ G(I) to have different belief types and decision
rules.
Generalized ex post social choice rules
A social choice rule yields a group choice function based on the decision–theoretic models
that describe the individuals. For any F ⊆ Φ, C is a choice function for F if and only
if C : (2F − {∅}) → (2F − {∅}) and C(X) ⊆ X for any X ⊆ F . M = 〈F , C〉
3Note that this notion of belief refinement is transitive: If p′ refines p and p′′ refines p′, then p′′ refines
p. Our proofs work for any transitive notion of belief refinements.
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is a choice model if and only if F ⊆ Φ and C is a choice function on F . We define
FM and CM as the entities such that M = 〈FM , CM〉. For arbitrary choice models
M = 〈F , C〉 and M ′ = 〈F ′, C ′〉, we say that M ′ refines M if and only if (i) F ⊆ F ′ and
(ii) C(X) = C ′(X) for all X ⊆ F . We call s a utility aggregation rule if and only if, for
any Γ–partition P , s maps any vector 〈ui〉 ∈ u(P)I to a choice function c on P (i.e., a
function c : (2P − {∅}) → (2P − {∅}) with c(X) ⊆ X for any X ⊆ P). We emphasize
the generality of this concept. It subsumes the situation of our numerical example where
real–valued one–dimensional individual utilities were aggregated into a real–valued one–
dimensional group utility. Trivially, any group utility and any acyclical group preference
generates a group choice function over consequences. Our concept of a utility aggregation
rule avoids any rationality assumptions like the weak axiom of revealed preference.
We need only very general assumptions about the manner in which individual beliefs
enter an ex post social choice rule. Our general definition of an ex post social choice rule
altogether avoids mentioning any belief aggregation rule and, instead, uses the following
unanimity concept. For any 〈Mi〉 ∈ G(I), any A ∈ [P〈Mi〉] and any f ∈ F〈Mi〉, we say
that A is unanimously f–one in 〈Mi〉 if and only if, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ I, A is PMi,f , GMi–one.
For f, g ∈ Φ, we say that f absolutely dominates g in 〈Mi〉 w.r.t. s if and only if there
are A,B ∈ [P〈Mi〉] such that A is unanimously f–one in 〈Mi〉, B is unanimously g–one
in 〈Mi〉 and [s(〈uMi〉)]({D,C}) = {C} for all C ⊆ A and all D ⊆ B (C,D ∈ P〈Mi〉). The
following definition merely requires ex post social choice rules to yield choice functions
over the same set of acts that is evaluated by the individuals (clause 2), to evaluate
consequences by aggregating individual utilities in a way that is not contaminated by
beliefs or evaluations of acts and, in binary choices, to choose absolutely dominant acts in
a sense that is much weaker than the sure–thing principle or related dominance conditions
(clause 3).
Definition 2.1 S is an ex post social choice rule if and only if (1) there is some non–
empty set G ⊆ G(I) such that S : G → C, (2) for all 〈Mi〉 ∈ G, we have FS(〈Mi〉) = F〈Mi〉
and (3) there is some cardinal–ordinal utility aggregation rule s such that for all 〈Mi〉 ∈ G
and all f, g ∈ F〈Mi〉: If f absolutely dominates g in 〈Mi〉 w.r.t. s, then CS(〈Mi〉)({f, g}) =
{f}.
It is easy to verify the consistency of this definition. Let GS be the set such that
S : GS → R. We call any s that satisfies condition (3) a utility aggregation rule associated
with S. An ex post social choice rule S has a wide domain if and only if, for any
〈M∗i 〉 ∈ GS, any Γ–partition P , any F ⊆ Φ, any 〈Pi〉 with Pi : F → p〈M∗i 〉(P) (1 ≤ i ≤ I)
and any 〈ui〉 ∈ u(P)I , there is some 〈Mi〉 ∈ GS such that, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ I, P〈Mi〉 = P ,
uMi = ui, F ⊆ F〈Mi〉 and PMi,f = Pi,f for all f ∈ F . The clause F ⊆ F〈Mi〉 allows the
underlying structure of acts to force the inclusion of certain acts into the models 〈Mi〉.
In Savage’s framework, for example, we have to consider as acts all functions from worlds
to consequences and are not free to choose some smaller set F .
4
Instability theorem
We now formulate the remaining key condition of ‘one–refinability’ which will supply
us with a structure that is rich enough for our purpose. A belief type is one–refinable
relative to a decision rule just in case we can elect any distinction introduced by a fine–
grained model to be considered one. If the fine–grained model splits each consequence
C ∈ P of the coarse model into two consequences C1, C2, then we can find a belief
measure relative to which the set {C1|C ∈ P} is considered one. In order to state our
requirement formally, we need two auxiliary definitions that concern a function φ that
associates coarse–grained with fine–grained consequences. The first definition ensures
that the function φ is compatible with the way in which P ′ refines P . We say that P ′
φ–refines P if and only if P and P ′ are Γ–partitions with P ⊆ [P ′] and φ is such that
φ : P → P ′ and φ(C) ⊆ C for all C ∈ P . Our second auxiliary definition states that
the set of fine–grained consequences selected by φ are treated as p′, G–one. Suppose
that G is a decision rule for p and p, p′ ∈ p. We then say that 〈P ′, p′〉 oneφ–refines
〈P , p〉 w.r.t. G if and only if P ′ φ–refines P , p ∈ p(P), p′ ∈ p(P ′), p′ refines p, and⋃{φ(C)|C ∈ P} is p′, G–one. Finally, we can state the definition we had in mind. A
belief type p is one–refinable w.r.t. G if and only if, for all P , P ′ and φ such that P ′ φ–
refines P and for all p ∈ p(P), there exists some p′ ∈ p(P ′) such that 〈P ′, p′〉 oneφ–refines
〈P , p〉 w.r.t. G. We note that probabilities and capacities are clearly one–refinable w.r.t.
maximizing (Choquet–)expected utility. We say that an ex post social choice rule S is
for one–refinable models if and only if, for every 〈Mi〉 ∈ GS, pMi is one–refinable w.r.t.
GMi (1 ≤ i ≤ I).
After formulating several properties of utility aggregation rules, we will state our
instability theorem. A Γ–partition is refinable if and only if every C ∈ P has at
least two elements. Suppose s is a cardinal–ordinal utility aggregation rule. s is non–
exceptional if and only if there exists some refinable Γ–partition P , (possibly identi-
cal) consequences C1, . . . , CI , D1, . . . , DI ∈ P and 〈ui〉, 〈u′i〉 ∈ u(P)I such that for any
1 ≤ i, j, k ≤ I) ui(Ci) = u′i(Ci) and ui(Di) = u′i(Di), but [s(〈ui〉)]({Cj, Dk}) = {Cj}
and [s(〈u′i〉)]({Cj, Dk}) = {Dk}. For concreteness, we mention already the special case
in which s′ aggregates the individuals’ real–valued one–dimensional utilities on P into
a real–valued one–dimensional group utility on P and where s is the utility aggregation
rule generated by s′ (i.e., s yields the choice function generated by the group utility ag-
gregated by s′). If s′ is a utilitarian rule with weights λi, then s is non–exceptional if and
only if the weights of at least two individuals are non–zero. By Observation A.5 in the
appendix, a utility aggregation rule must be non–exceptional if it is Pareto optimal (cf.
below). s is independent of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) if and only if, if ui(C) = u
′
i(C)
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ I and all C ∈ X, then [s(〈ui〉)](X) = [s(〈u′i〉)](X) (for any Γ–partitions P
and P ′, any X ⊆ P ∩ P ′ and any 〈ui〉 ∈ u(P)I and 〈u′i〉 ∈ u(P ′)I). Note that IIA forces
the aggregation of utilities to be independent of the fine–graining of the consequence
partition. When, as is usual in the literature, the consequence partition is held fixed,
this aspect of IIA cannot be expressed. Note, moreover, that IIA for utility aggregation
rules (which deliver a group choice function over consequences) is an extremely weak
and ubiquitous condition since we do not presuppose the existence of a group prefer-
5
ence or an axiom of revealed preference (cf. the applications in the following section
and Plott, 1976). s is (ex post) Pareto optimal if and only if [s(〈ui〉)]({C,D}) = {C}
when ui(C) ≥ ui(D) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ I but uj(C) > uj(D) for some 1 ≤ j ≤ I (for any
Γ–partition P , any C,D ∈ P and any 〈ui〉 ∈ u(P)I).
In a refinement, we now require not only preferences but also the evaluation functions
and beliefs to remain unchanged. For any decision-theoretic models M and M ′ with
pM = pM ′ and GM = GM ′ , we say that M
′ refines M if and only if (1) PM ⊆ [PM ′ ], (2)
FM ⊆ FM ′ and, for all f ∈ FM , (3) PM ′,f refines PM,f and (4) VM(f) = VM ′(f). This
definition is motivated by our interest in the instability theorem. In different contexts,
we might wish to speak of an individual refinement already when individual preferences
are left unchanged (replacing clause (4) of the definition of individual refinements by the
condition that VM ′(f) ≥ VM ′(g) iff VM ′(f) ≥ VM ′(g) for all f, g ∈ F). With our stronger
definition, however, we will obtain a strong instability result. Our proofs will construct
a violation of stability even for individual refinements in which evaluations remain un-
changed. A fortiori, there then are violations of stability for individual refinements in
the weaker sense.
Theorem 2.2 Suppose S is an ex post social choice rule that has a wide domain and
that is for one–refinable models with an associated utility aggregation rule that is (1) IIA
and non–exceptional, or (2) Pareto optimal.
Then there is an infinite sequence 〈Mni 〉n∈N of vectors of decision–theoretic models in
GS such that 〈Mn+1i 〉 refines 〈Mni 〉 (for all n ∈ N) and S leads to a sequence of group
models 〈S(〈Mni 〉)〉n∈N that oscillates between absolute dominance of f over g and absolute
dominance of g over f (for some f, g ∈ F〈M0i 〉). Hence, S is not stable under refinements.
The proof of this theorem uses the same technique as Hild (2001a, 2001b) and draw
on extreme disagreements of the individuals’ belief measures.
Applications
Hild (2001a) discusses utility aggregation rules that satisfy the preconditions of our In-
stability Theorems. Individuals may be described by any of the decision theory listed in
Section 1. Any of these models is one–refinable and a decision–theoretic model in the
sense of our definition.
We comment briefly on a special class of ex post social choice rule that generates social
preferences by some decision theory on the list of Section 1 using aggregated beliefs and
aggregated utilities. Assume that individual beliefs are represented either by subjective
probabilities or, more generally, by capacities.4 Choose any decision–theoretic model
4We say that p is a probability on P if and only if p : [P] → R, p(∅) = 0, p(Γ) = 1 and p(A ∪ B) =
p(A) + p(B) for all A,B ∈ [P] with A∩B = ∅. p is a capacity on P if and only if p : [P]→ R, p(∅) = 0,
p(Γ) = 1 and p is monotonic w.r.t. set inclusion. C(p, u) :=
∫∞
0
p(u ≥ x) dx+ ∫ 0−∞[p(u ≥ x)− 1] dx is
the Choquet–expectation of u w.r.t. p.
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on our list as a decision theory for the group. When this theory requires aggregated
probabilities, let T aggregate capacities 〈pi〉 on P into a probability on P . When the
group’s decision theory requires only aggregated capacities, let T aggregate capacities
〈pi〉 on P into a capacity on P .5 Let s′ cardinal–cardinal utility aggregation rule that
aggregates utilities on P into a utility on P . We say that T satisfies certainty agreement
if and only if, for Γ–partition P , any A ∈ [P ] and any vector 〈pi〉 of capacities on P , if
pi(B) = pi(B∩A) for all B ∈ [P ] and all 1 ≤ i ≤ I, then T (〈pi〉)(B) = T (〈pi〉)(B∩A) for
all B ∈ [P ]. In case pi is a probability, we have pi(B) = pi(B ∩A) for all B ∈ [P ] exactly
when pi(A) = 1. Now assume that the group applies its decision theory to the aggregated
utility and the aggregated belief measure (assuming that T yields probabilities when
required by the decision theory). The social choice rule thus defined satisfies Definition
2.1 (cf. Observation A.6).6 The conclusions of the ex post instability theorems then
apply if s′ has the properties specified in the theorems.
3 Robust Aggregation
We finally turn to Levi’s (1990) robust mode of aggregation. In terms of instabilities,
the situation for the robust mode is even worse than for the ex post mode: Any non–
trivial robust aggregation is unstable. The idea behind robust aggregation is to consider
not only the individuals’ actual preferences but also what we can call their ‘empathetic’
preferences. Empathetic preferences are the preferences that real individuals would have
if they were to keep their own utilities but adopted another individual’s probabilities. We
now assume that all 〈Mi〉 ∈ G(I) have the same belief type and decision rule (pMi = pMj
and GMi = GMj for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ I). For 1 ≤ k, l ≤ I and 〈Mi〉 ∈ G(I) we define Mkl as
the evaluation model such that FMkl = F〈Mi〉 and VMkl(f) = G〈Mi〉(PMk,f , uMl) for all f ∈
F〈Mi〉. Note that Mi denotes a decision–theoretic model while Mii denotes an evaluation
model. An evaluation model Mkl contains the evaluation function of a hypothetical
individual with individual k’s beliefs and l’s utility. There are I2 such hypothetical
individuals. For any 〈Mi〉 ∈ G(I), we write f Mij g if and only if VMij(f, g)  VMij(g, f)
(for all 1 ≤ i, j ≤ I and f, g ∈ F〈Mi〉).
Let V(I) be the set of all vectors 〈Fi, Vi〉 of evaluation models with Fi = Fj ⊆ Φ and
Vi : Fi → R (1 ≤ i, j ≤ I). For 〈Mi〉 ∈ V(I), let F〈Mi〉 := FM1 . S ′ is an ex ante social
choice rule if and only if there is some non–empty set V ⊆ V(I) such that S ′ : V → C
and FS(〈Mi〉) = F〈Mi〉 for all 〈Mi〉 ∈ V . S is a robust social choice rule if and only if
there is some non–empty set G ⊆ G(I) with S : G → C and some ex ante social choice
rule S ′ : V(I2) → C such that S(〈Mi〉) = S ′(〈Mkl〉) for all 〈Mi〉 ∈ G. Any S ′ with this
5Clearly, we can apply T even if individual beliefs are represented by probabilities, since probabilities
are also capacities.
6In the case of regret theory, the group’s modification function must be regular. In the case of expected
utility with threshold α0 ∈ R and an aggregated group utility u0, we define the group’s preference r over
P such that C r D iff u0(C)− u0(D) > α0 (for any C,D ∈ P). Then clauses 3a and 3b of Definition
2.1 are satisfied.
7
property is an ex ante rule associated with S.7 If S is a robust social choice rule, let GS
be the set such that S : GS → R.
We now formulate several additional properties of a robust social choice rule S. S is
non–trivial if and only if there are 〈Mi〉, 〈M∗i 〉 ∈ GS such that F〈Mi〉 = F〈M∗i 〉, 〈VMi〉 =〈VM∗i 〉 but S(〈Mi〉) 6= S(〈M∗i 〉). S is independent of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) if and
only if S has some associated ex ante rule S ′ : V → C such that, for all 〈F , Vi〉, 〈F ′, V ′i 〉 ∈
V and all X ⊆ F∩F ′, if Vi|X = V ′i |X for all 1 ≤ i ≤ I2, then CS′(〈Mi〉)(X) = CS′(〈M ′i〉)(X).
S is Pareto optimal if and only if, for all 〈Mi〉 in the domain of S and all f, g ∈ F〈Mi〉, if
f Mij g for all 1 ≤ i, j ≤ I but f Mkl g for some 1 ≤ k, l ≤ I, then CS(〈Mi〉)({f, g}) =
{f}. S is has a wide domain if and only if for any 〈M∗i 〉 ∈ GS, any Γ–partition P , any
F ⊆ Φ, any 〈Pi〉 with Pi : F → p〈M∗i 〉(P) (for all 1 ≤ i ≤ I) and any 〈ui〉 ∈ u(P)I , there
is some 〈Mi〉 ∈ GS such that, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ I, P〈Mi〉 = P , uMi = ui, F ⊆ F〈Mi〉, and
PMi,f = Pi,f for all f ∈ F .
Finally, we formulate two additional properties of belief types and decision rules. We
will require that, for suitable two–dimensional partitions, we can find a belief measure
that delivers any arbitrary marginal belief measures. We will require decision rules to
depend only on the values of belief measures and utilities and on no other features of
consequences. Formally, a belief type p is cross–product refinable if and only if for all
Γ–partitions P , P∗ and Q and for all p ∈ p(P), p∗ ∈ p(P∗), if X∩X∗ ∈ Q for all X ∈ P ,
X∗ ∈ P∗,8 then there exists a q ∈ p(Q) that refines p and refines p∗. Both probabilities
and capacities are cross–product refinable (cf. Observation A.6). A decision rule G for p
is invariant under relabelling if and only if for all Γ–partitions P and P ′, any 1–1 mapping
φ : P ′ → P and any p ∈ p(P) and u ∈ u(P), we have G(p, u) = G(p ◦ φ¯, u ◦ φ). All
decision theories listed in the introduction have this property. Finally, a robust social
choice rule S is for models that are one–refinable, cross–product refinable and invariant
under relabelling if and only if, for every 〈Mi〉 ∈ GS, p〈Mi〉 cross–product refinable and
one–refinable w.r.t. G〈Mi〉 and G〈Mi〉 is invariant under relabelling.
Theorem 3.1 Suppose that S is a robust social choice rule that has a wide domain is
for models that are one–refinable, cross–product refinable and invariant under relabelling.
If S is non–trivial, then it cannot be stable under refinements.
Theorem 3.2 Suppose that S is a robust social choice rule that has a wide domain and is
for one–refinable. Suppose S is (1) IIA, non–trivial and for models that are cross–product
refinable and invariant under relabelling, or (2) Pareto optimal.
Then there is an infinite sequence 〈Mni 〉n∈N of vectors of decision–theoretic models in
GS such that 〈Mn+1i 〉 refines 〈Mni 〉 (for all n ∈ N) and S leads to a sequence of group
models 〈S(〈Mni 〉)〉n∈N that, for some f ∈ F〈M0i 〉, oscillates between choosing and not
7There are generally several ex ante rule associated with S when S has a restricted domain.
8By the definition of a partition (footnote 2), this implies that X ∩ X∗ 6= ∅ for any X ∈ P and
X∗ ∈ P∗.
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choosing f from some choice set X ⊆ F〈M0i 〉 (i.e., there is some X ⊆ F〈M0i 〉 and f ∈ X
with f ∈ CS(〈M2ni 〉)(X) and f /∈ CS(〈M2n+1i 〉)(X) for all n ∈ N).
We already noted that probabilities and capacities are cross–product refinable. Hence,
Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 3.2 apply to individuals who are described by any of the
decision theories listed in Section 1.
9
Appendix A Proofs: Ex Post Aggregation
Lemmata and Observations
For any u, u′ ∈ u(P) and any A ∈ [P], we write u =A u′ if and only if u(C) = u′(C) for all C ∈ P with
C ⊆ A.
Observation A.1 Suppose p is a belief type and G is a decision rule for p. Suppose furthermore that
P is a Γ–partition, p ∈ p(P) and A,B ∈ [P]. Then the following holds:
1.) Γ is not p,G–null.
2.) If A and B are p,G–null, then A ∪B is p,G–null.
3.) If A is p,G–null, then −A is not p,G–null.
4.) If A is p,G–null and B ⊆ A, then B is p,G–null.
Proof: 1.) Because G is non–trivial. 2.) Suppose that A and B are p,G–null. Take any u, u′ ∈ u(P)
with u =−(A∪B) u′ and define w :=−A u and w :=A u′. Hence, w ∈ u(P). Since w =−B∩A u′ and
w =−B∩−A u =−B∩−A u′, we have w =−B u′. Hence, G(p, u) = G(p, w) = G(p, u′) for any u, u′ ∈ u(P)
with u =−(A∪B) u′. 3.) Suppose that A and −A are p,G–null. By (2), Γ is p,G–null but, by (1) Γ is not
p,G–null. Contradiction! 4.) Suppose that A is p,G–null and B ⊆ A. Then, for all u, u′ ∈ u(P) with
u =−A u′, we have G(p, u) = G(p, u′). Since −A ⊆ −B, we obtain G(p, u) = G(p, u′) for all u, u′ ∈ u(P)
with u =−B u′. 
Lemma A.2 Suppose that p is a belief type with p, p′ ∈ p and G is a decision rule for p. Suppose
furthermore that 〈P ′, p′〉 oneφ–refines 〈P, p〉 w.r.t. G. Then, for any A ∈ [P], φ¯(A) is p′, G–one
whenever A is p,G–one.
Proof: Suppose that A ∈ [P] is p,G–one and u, u′ ∈ u(P ′) with u =φ¯(A) u′. Define u∗, u∗∗ ∈ u(P)
by u∗ := u◦φ and u∗∗ := u′ ◦φ. Since u∗ =A u∗∗ and A is p,G–one, we have G(p, u∗) = G(p, u∗∗). Next,
define u†, u†† ∈ u(P ′) by u†(X) := u∗(C) and u††(X) := u∗∗(C) for all C ∈ P, and X ∈ P ′ with X ⊆ C.
Since G is invariant under empty refinements, G(p, u∗) = G(p′, u†) and G(p, u∗∗) = G(p′, u††). Since
u† =φ¯(Γ) u, u†† =φ¯(Γ) u′ and φ¯(Γ) is p′, G–one (because 〈P ′, p′〉 oneφ–refines 〈P, p〉 w.r.t. G), we have
G(p′, u†) = G(p′, u) and G(p′, u††) = G(p′, u′). Hence, G(p′, u) = G(p′, u′) whence φ¯(A) is p′, G–one. 
We say that a decision rule G for p is invariant under one–refinements if and only if, for all P, P ′,
p, p′ ∈ p and φ such that 〈P ′, p′〉 oneφ–refines 〈P, p〉 w.r.t. G and for all u ∈ u(P), u′ ∈ u(P ′) and all
A ∈ [P], if A is p,G–one and u =A u′ ◦ φ, then G(p, u) = G(p′, u′).
Lemma A.3 Any decision rule is invariant under one–refinements.
Proof: Let G be a decision rule for p and let p, p′ ∈ p. Suppose that 〈P ′, p′〉 oneφ–refines 〈P, p〉
w.r.t. G and that u ∈ u(P), u′ ∈ u(P ′). Suppose furthermore that A ∈ [P] is p,G–one and u =A u′ ◦ φ.
Let u∗ ∈ u(P ′) be the function such that u∗(X) := u(C) for all X ∈ P ′, C ∈ P and X ⊆ C. Because
G is invariant under empty refinements, G(p, u) = G(p′, u∗). On the other hand, G(p′, u∗) = G(p′, u′)
because u∗ =φ¯(A) u′ and φ¯(A) is p′, G–one (by Lemma A.2). Hence, G(p, u) = G(p′, u′). 
Lemma A.4 Suppose G is a decision rule for p and p is one–refinable. Then for every Γ–partition P
and every C ∈ P, there exists some p ∈ p(P) such that C is p,G–one.
Proof: Let P an arbitrary Γ–partition and C ∈ P. Let φ : {Γ} → P be defined by φ(Γ) := C.
Obviously, P φ–refines {Γ}. Let p∗ ∈ p(Γ). Since p is one–refinable, there is a p ∈ p(P) such that
φ(Γ) = C is p,G–one. 
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Lemma A.5 Suppose s is a cardinal–ordinal utility aggregation rule that is (1) IIA and non–exceptional,
or (2) Pareto optimal. Then there exist vij , w
i
j ∈ Zi with vii = wii and vii+I = wii+I (1 ≤ i ≤ I,
1 ≤ j ≤ 2I) such that for all Γ–partitions P with 2 · I different consequences Y1, . . . , Y2I ∈ P and
for all 〈ui〉, 〈u′i〉 ∈ u(P)I , ui(Yj) = vij and u′i(Yj) = wij (for all 1 ≤ i ≤ I, 1 ≤ j ≤ 2I), we have
[s(〈ui〉)]({Yl, Ym}) = {Yl} but [s(〈u′i〉)]({Yl, Ym}) = {Ym} (for all 1 ≤ l ≤ I and I + 1 ≤ m ≤ 2I).
Proof: Cf. Hild (2001a)
Observation A.6 Let p be the set of all capacity on all Γ–partition. For any (finite) Γ–partition P,
let p(P) be the set of all capacities P. Let u be the set of all one–dimensional utilities. Let C(., .) be
Choquet–expectation (cf. footnote 4). Then the following holds:
1.) For any p ∈ p(P) and A ∈ [P], A is p, C–one iff p(B) = p(B ∩A) for all B ∈ [P].
2.) p is a) one–refinable and b) cross–product refinable.
3.) C is a decision rule (i.e., non–trivial and invariant under empty refinements).
4.) For all p ∈ p(P) and all A ∈ [P] such that A is p, C–one, we have min{u(C)|C ∈ P, C ⊆ A} ≤
C(p, u) ≤ max{u(C)|C ∈ P, C ⊆ A}, for any u ∈ u(P).
Proof: For a fixed Γ–partition P and u ∈ u(P), we write ‘{u ≥ x}’ instead of ‘⋃{C ∈ P|u(C) ≥ x}’
and we omit curly brackets where this is unambiguous. 1.) We first show ‘if’. Suppose that p(B) =
p(B ∩ A) for all B ∈ [P] and let u, u′ ∈ u(P) with u =A u′. We note that {u ≥ x}, {u′ ≥ x} ∈ [P] and,
hence, p(u ≥ x) = p({u ≥ x} ∩A) and p(u′ ≥ x) = p({u′ ≥ x} ∩A). Since {u ≥ x} ∩A = {u′ ≥ x} ∩A,
we obtain p(u ≥ x) = p(u′ ≥ x) and, thus, C(p, u) = C(p, u′). Therefore, A is p, C–one. We now show
‘only if’. For any X ∈ [P] and define 1X ∈ u(P) as follows: 1X(Y ) = 1 if Y ⊆ X and 1X(Y ) = 0
otherwise (for all Y ∈ P). Assume that A is p, C–one and B ∈ [P]. Clearly, 1B =A 1B∩A. Hence,
C(p,1B) = C(p,1B∩A). This implies
∫∞
0
p(1B ≥ x) dx =
∫∞
0
p({1B∩A ≥ x} dx and p(B) = p(B ∩A).
2.a) Suppose that p is a capacity on P and P ′ φ–refines P. Recall that φ¯ is injective and has range
X := φ¯(Γ). We can, therefore, define p′(B) := p(φ¯−1(B ∩ X)) for all B ∈ [P ′]. It follows that p′ is a
capacity on P ′, p′ refines p (because A = φ¯−1(A ∩ X) for all A ∈ [P]), and X is p′, C–one (because
p′(B ∩ X) = p′(B) for all B ∈ [P ′]). Thus, 〈P ′, p′〉 oneφ–refines 〈P, p〉. 2.b) Suppose P, P∗ and Q
are Γ–partitions such that X ∩ X∗ ∈ Q (for all X ∈ P, X∗ ∈ P∗) and p ∈ p(P), p∗ ∈ p(P∗). By
the definition of a partition (p. 2), we know that X ∩X∗ 6= ∅ for any X ∈ P and X∗ ∈ P∗ and that
for any Y ∈ Q there are X ∈ P and X∗ ∈ P∗ with Y = X ∩ X∗ (since all sets of the form X ∩ X∗
are mutually disjoint and their totality is jointly exhaustive of Γ). Similarly, (*) A ∩ A∗ ∈ [Q] − {∅}
for any A ∈ [P] − {∅} and A∗ ∈ [P∗] − {∅}. We say that A and A∗ are composers of C ∈ [Q] if and
only if A ∈ [P], A∗ ∈ [P∗] and C = A ∩ A∗. We say that C ∈ [Q] is composable if and only if there
are composers of C; otherwise, we call C non–composable. Note that ∅ is non–composable. We show
that (**) any composable C ∈ [Q] has unique composers. Suppose A1, A2 ∈ [P], A∗1, A∗2 ∈ [P∗] and
C = A1 ∩ A∗1 = A2 ∩ A∗2. Since C is non–empty, A1, A2, A∗1, A∗2 also have to be non–empty. We can
then express C, on the one hand, as the union of (A1 ∩ −A2) ∩ A∗1 and (A1 ∩ A2) ∩ A∗1 and, on the
other hand, as the union of (−A1 ∩ A2) ∩ A∗2 and (A1 ∩ A2) ∩ A∗2. Since (A1 ∩ −A2) and (−A1 ∩ A2)
are disjoint, we must have (A1 ∩ −A2) ∩ A∗1 = (−A1 ∩ A2) ∩ A∗2 = ∅. Since A∗1, A∗2 are non–empty, (*)
implies that (A1 ∩ −A2) = (−A1 ∩ A2) = ∅ which is equivalent to A1 = A2. Analogously, we conclude
that A∗1 = A
∗
2 and, thus, establish claim (**). We now define a capacity q on Q in three steps. Step
1: For any composable C ∈ [Q], let q(C) := p(A) · p∗(A∗) where A ∈ [P] and A∗ ∈ [P∗] are the unique
composers of C. Step 2: For any non–composable B ∈ [Q] − {∅}, let q(B) := max q(C) where the
maximum is taken over all composable C ∈ [Q] with C ⊆ B. Step 3: q(∅) := 0. For any composable
C1, C2 ∈ [Q] with C1 ⊆ C2, we now have q(C1) ≤ q(C2) because the composers of C1 must be subsets of
the composers of C2 and capacities are monotonic w.r.t. set inclusion. Hence, (***) for any composable
C ∈ [Q], we have q(C) = max∑ q(C ′) where the maximum is taken over all composable C ′ ∈ [Q] with
C ′ ⊆ C. We now show that q thus defined is indeed a capacity on Q. By Step 3, q(∅) = 0. By Step
1, q(Γ) = p(Γ) · p∗(Γ) = 1. It remains to be shown that q is monotonic w.r.t. set inclusion. Suppose
B1, B2 ∈ [Q] and B1 ⊆ B2. We only consider the case where B1, B2 6= ∅ (all other cases are trivial).
By (***), we know, on the one hand, that q(B1) = max
∑
q(C1) where the maximum is taken over
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all composable C1 ∈ [Q] with C1 ⊆ B1 and, on the other hand, that q(B2) = max
∑
q(C2) where the
maximum is taken over all composable C2 ∈ [Q] with C2 ⊆ B2. Since B1 ⊆ B2, every composable subset
C1 ∈ [Q] of B1 is also a subset of B2. Hence, q(B1) ≤ q(B2). Finally, we note that the composers
of any A ∈ [P] are A and Γ while the composers of any A∗ ∈ [P∗] are Γ and A∗. Hence, by Step 1,
q(A) = p(A) · 1 and q(A∗) = 1 · p∗(A∗). We thus establish that q refines both p and p∗. (We notice en
passant that, by this construction, q is not a probability even if p and p∗ are probabilities.) 3.) Trivial.
4.) Suppose A ∈ [P] is p, C–one, u ∈ u(P) and define s := max{u(C)|C ∈ P, C ⊆ A}. We only prove
C(p, u) ≤ s. The second half of the claim is analogous. We identify s ∈ R with the function u′ ∈ u(P)
that is constant = s. Define v ∈ u(P) by v :=A u and v :=−A s. Since A is p, C–one, C(p, u) = C(p, v).
Since v ≤ s, C(p, v) ≤ C(p, s) (by the monotonicity of C(p, .). Hence, C(p, u) ≤ C(p, s) = s. 
Theorems
For any 〈Mi〉 ∈ G(I), any A ∈ [P〈Mi〉], any f ∈ F〈Mi〉 and any 1 ≤ i ≤ I, we say that A is f–one in Mi
if and only if A is PMi,f , GMi–one. Note that in the following proofs there is an important notational
difference between ‘Pi’ (a function P indexed by i) and ‘PMi ’ (the function P occurring in Mi).
Theorem 2.2 Proof: Suppose S is an ex post social choice rule that has a wide domain and is for
one–refinable models and s is a utility aggregation rule associated with S. Suppose furthermore that
(1) s is IIA and non–exceptional, or (2) s is Pareto optimal. By assumption, Γ is a least countably
infinite and, thus, we can partition it into 2 · I different, at least countably infinite, sets X1, . . . , X2I .
For each 1 ≤ k ≤ 2I, we can hence enumerate the elements of some countably infinite subset of Xk
in a sequence x1k, x
2
k, . . . , x
n
k , . . . (where x
n
k 6= xn
′
k for any n, n
′ ∈ N+). We then define a sequence 〈Pnk 〉
of partitions of Xk by Pnk = {{x1k}, . . . , {xnk}, Xk − {x1k, . . . , xnk}} for all n ∈ N+. We write X0k := Xk
and Xnk := Xk − {x1k, . . . , xnk} for all n ∈ N+. Let P0 := {X1, . . . , X2I} and Pn := Pn1 ∪ . . . ∪ Pn2I for
all n ∈ N+. Let φ0 : P0 → P1 and ψ0 : P0 → P1 be defined by φ0(X0k) := X1k and ψ0(X0k) := {x1k}
(for all 1 ≤ k ≤ 2I). For any n ∈ N+, let φn : Pn → Pn+1 and ψn : Pn → Pn+1 be defined by
φn({xn′k }) := {xn
′
k } and ψn({xn
′
k }) := {xn
′
k } for all n′ ≤ n (n′ ∈ N+) and by φn(Xnk ) := Xn+1k and
ψn(Xnk ) := {xn+1k } (for all 1 ≤ k ≤ 2I). Trivially, Pn+1 both φn–refines and ψn–refines Pn (for all
n ∈ N).
By Lemma A.5, there exists 〈M∗i 〉 ∈ GS and vij , wij ∈ RL with vii = wii and vii+I = wii+I (1 ≤ i ≤ I,
1 ≤ j ≤ 2I) such that for all Γ–partitions P with 2 · I different consequences Y1, . . . , Y2I ∈ P and for
all 〈ui〉, 〈u′i〉 ∈ u(P)I with ui(Yj) = vij , and u′i(Yj) = wij (for all 1 ≤ i ≤ I, 1 ≤ j ≤ 2I), we have
[s(〈ui〉)]({Yl, Ym}) = {Yl} but [s(〈u′i〉)]({Yl, Ym}) = {Ym} (for all 1 ≤ l ≤ I and I + 1 ≤ m ≤ 2I). Let
pi := pM∗i , and Gi := GM∗i (for all 1 ≤ i ≤ I). We now recursively define a sequence 〈un1 , . . . , unI 〉n∈N
of vectors of individual utility functions such that, for each n ∈ N and 1 ≤ i ≤ I, uni ∈ u(Pn). For
all even n ∈ N, let uni (Xnk ) := vik and, for all odd n ∈ N, let uni (Xnk ) := wik (for all 1 ≤ i ≤ I and all
1 ≤ k ≤ 2I). Finally, for any n, n′ ∈ N+ with n′ ≤ n, let un+1i ({xn
′
k }) := uni ({xn
′
k }) and, for any n ∈ N,
let un+1i ({xn+1k }) := uni (Xnk ) (for all 1 ≤ i ≤ I, and 1 ≤ k ≤ 2I). It follows from Lemma A.5 that, for
all n ∈ N, (*) [s(〈u2ni 〉)]({X2nl , X2nm }) = {X2nl } and [s(〈u2n+1i 〉)]({X2n+1l , X2n+1m }) = {X2n+1m } (for all
1 ≤ l ≤ I and I + 1 ≤ m ≤ 2I). Moreover, (**) uni = un+1i ◦ ψn for any n ∈ N and 1 ≤ i ≤ I. Next we
note that, by assumption, there are c, d ∈ Φ with c 6= d. It can be shown by induction that there is a
sequence 〈Mn1 , . . . ,MnI 〉n∈N of vectors of individual decision–theoretic models such that, for all n ∈ N,
〈Mn1 , . . . ,MnI 〉 ∈ GS and, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ I, P〈Mni 〉 = Pn, uMni = uni , c, d ∈ F〈Mni 〉 ⊆ F〈Mn+1i 〉, pMni = pi,
GMni = Gi, and (i) X
0
i is c–one in M
0
i , PMn+1i ,c oneφn–refines PM
n
i ,c
w.r.t. Gi, (ii) X0i+I is d–one in M
0
i ,
PMn+1i ,d
oneφn–refines PMni ,d w.r.t. Gi, and, finally, (iii) PMn+1i ,f oneψn–refines PM
n
i ,f
w.r.t. Gi for all
f ∈ F〈Mi〉 − {c, d}. Using Lemma A.2, we can show by induction that (i’) Xni is c–one in Mni and (ii’)
Xni+I is d–one in M
n
i , while, trivially, (iii’) Γ is f–one in M
n
i (for all n ∈ N, 1 ≤ i ≤ I, f ∈ F〈Mi〉).
We now show that 〈Mn+1i 〉 refines 〈Mni 〉 (for all n ∈ N). We need to show that Gi(PMni ,f , uMni ) =
Gi(PMn+1i ,f , uMn+1i ) for all f ∈ F〈Mi〉, 1 ≤ i ≤ I, n ∈ N. We note uMn+1i (φ
n(Xni )) = uMn+1i (X
n+1
i ) =
12
vii = w
i
i = uMni (X
n
i ) and similarly for d, while for f ∈ F〈Mi〉 − {c, d} we have (**) uMni = uMn+1i ◦ ψ
n
(1 ≤ i ≤ I, n ∈ N). The claim the follows by applying Lemma A.3 to (i)–(iii) and (i’)–(iii’). Finally,
we show that (+) CS(〈M2ni 〉)({c, d}) = {c} but (++) CS(〈M2n+1i 〉)({c, d}) = {d} (for all n ∈ N). Applying
Observation A.1.4 to (i’)–(ii’), we find that Xn1 ∪ . . . ∪ XnI is unanimously c–one in 〈Mni 〉 and XnI+1 ∪
. . . ∪ Xn2I is unanimously d–one in 〈Mni 〉 (for all n ∈ N). By Definition 2.1, (*) then implies (+) and
(++), i.e., c absolutely dominates d in 〈M2ni 〉 w.r.t. s whereas d absolutely dominates c in 〈M2n+1i 〉
w.r.t. s (for all n ∈ N). 
Appendix B Proofs: Robust Aggregation
We assume that all individuals share the same belief type p and decision rule G. For any decision–
theoretic model M = 〈P, u,F ,p, P,G〉, any Γ–partition P ′ and any 1–1 mapping φ : P → P ′, let the
φ–relabelling of M be defined as the model φM := 〈P ′, u ◦ φ−1,F ,p, P ′, G〉 where P ′ : F → p(P ′) is
the function such that P ′f := Pf ◦ φ¯−1 for all f ∈ F . For any robust social choice rule S with a wide
domain, we have 〈Mi〉 ∈ GS iff 〈φMi〉 ∈ GS .
Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 3.2.3 Preparation: Suppose that S is a robust social choice rule
that has a wide domain and that is for models that are one–refinable, cross–product refinable and
invariant under relabelling. Suppose S is non–trivial. Hence, there are 〈M∗i 〉, 〈M†i 〉 ∈ GS such that
F := F〈M∗i 〉 = F〈M†i 〉, 〈VM∗i 〉 = 〈VM†i 〉, and for some X ⊆ F and g ∈ X, (+) g ∈ CS(〈M∗i 〉)(X)
but g /∈ CS(〈M†i 〉)(X). Let N1 := |P〈M∗i 〉| and N2 := |P〈M†i 〉|. Then there is a Γ–partition P
′ with
|P ′| = N1 ·N2 each of whose elements is at least countably infinite. We enumerate the elements of P〈M∗i 〉,P〈M†i 〉 and P
′ such that P〈M∗i 〉 = {Cm1 |m1 = 1, 2, . . . , N1}, P〈M†i 〉 = {Dm2 |m2 = 1, 2, . . . , N2}, andP ′ = {Xm1,m2 |m1 = 1, 2, . . . , N1;m2 = 1, 2, . . . , N2}. We define P∗ := {
⋃{Xm1,1, . . . , Xm1,N2}|m1 =
1, 2, . . . , N1} and P† := {
⋃{X1,m2 , . . . , XN1,m2}|m2 = 1, 2, . . . , N2}. Obviously, P∗ and P† are Γ–
partitions and subsets of [P ′]. We define φ∗ : P〈M∗i 〉 → P∗ by φ∗(Cm1) :=
⋃{Xm1,1, . . . , Xm1,N2}
and φ† : P〈M†i 〉 → P
† by φ†(Dm2) :=
⋃{X1,m2 , . . . , XN1,m2} (for m1 = 1, 2, . . . N1, m2 = 1, 2, . . . N2).
Obviously, φ∗ and φ† are 1–1. We write M∗∗i := φ
∗M∗i for the φ
∗–relabelling of M∗i and M
††
i := φ
†M†i
for the φ†–relabelling of M†i and, recalling our restrictions on GS , we set p := p〈M∗i 〉 = p〈M†i 〉 and
G := G〈M∗i 〉 = G〈M†i 〉 (1 ≤ i ≤ I). Since S has a wide domain, we have 〈M
∗∗
i 〉, 〈M††i 〉 ∈ GS . We have
VM∗kl = VM∗∗kl and VM†kl = VM††kl (for all 1 ≤ k, l ≤ I) because G is invariant under relabelling. Let S
′ be
an ex ante social choice rule associated with S. Then S(〈M∗∗i 〉) = S′(〈M∗∗kl 〉) = S′(〈M††kl 〉) = S(〈M††i 〉)
yields (+’) g ∈ CS(〈M∗∗i 〉)(X) but g /∈ CS(〈M††i 〉)(X) (from (+)). Trivially, X ∩ X
′ ∈ P ′ for every
X ∈ P∗, X ′ ∈ P†. Since p is cross–product refinable, there thus exists P ′i : F → p(P ′) such that,
for all f ∈ F and all 1 ≤ i ≤ I, P ′i,f refines PM∗∗i ,f as well as PM††i ,f . For every 1 ≤ i ≤ I, let the
functions vi, wi ∈ u(P ′) be defined by vi(Xm1,m2) := uM∗∗i (
⋃{Xm1,1, . . . , Xm1,N2}) = uM∗i (Cm1) and
wi(Xm1,m2) := uM††i (
⋃{X1,m2 , . . . , XN1,m2}) = uM†i (Dm2) for all m1 = 1, 2, . . . N1, m2 = 1, 2, . . . N2.
Since S has a wide domain, there exists 〈M ′i〉 ∈ GS such that (for all 1 ≤ i ≤ I) P〈M ′i〉 = P ′, uM ′i = vi,F ⊆ F〈M ′i〉, p〈M ′i〉 = p, G〈M ′i〉 = G, and PM ′i ,f = P ′i,f for all f ∈ F . By the invariance of G under empty
refinements, it follows that (*) G(PM ′k,f , vl) = G(PM∗∗k ,f , uM∗∗l ) and G(PM ′k,f , wl) = G(PM††k ,f , uM††l )
whence VM ′kl(f) = VM∗∗kl (f) (for all f ∈ F , 1 ≤ k, l ≤ I). This completes our preparation and we now
turn to finishing the proofs for our two separate propositions.
Proof of Theorem 3.1: 〈M ′i〉 refines both 〈M∗∗i 〉 and 〈M††i 〉 because VM ′i (f) = VM∗∗i (f) (by (*)) and
VM∗∗i (f) = VM∗i (f) = VM†i (f) = VM††i (f) (for all 1 ≤ i ≤ I and f ∈ F). Now suppose S were stable and
non–trivial. This would require that g ∈ CS(〈M ′i〉)(X) and g /∈ CS(〈M ′i〉)(X) (by (+’)). Contradiction!
Hence, S is not stable if it is non–trivial. 
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Proof of Theorem 3.2.3: We recall that every Xm1,m2 ∈ P ′ is at least countably infinite (m1 =
1, 2, . . . N1, m2 = 1, 2, . . . N2). Proceeding as in Theorem 2.2, we can hence enumerate the elements of
some countably infinite subset of Xm1,m2 (m1 = 1, 2, . . . N1, m2 = 1, 2, . . . N2) in a sequence x
1
m1,m2 ,
x2m1,m2 , . . ., x
n
m1,m2 , . . . (where x
n
m1,m2 6= xn
′
m1,m2 for any n, n
′ ∈ N+). We then define a sequence 〈Pnm1,m2〉
of partitions of Xm1,m2 by Pnm1,m2 = {{x1m1,m2}, . . . , {xnm1,m2}, Xm1,m2 − {x1m1,m2 , . . . , xnm1,m2}} for all
n ∈ N+. We write X0m1,m2 := Xm1,m2 and Xnm1,m2 := Xm1,m2−{x1m1,m2 , . . . , xnm1,m2} for all n ∈ N+. LetP0 := P ′ = {Xm1,m2 |m1 = 1, 2, . . . N1;m2 = 1, 2, . . . N2} and Pn :=
⋃{Pnm1,m2 |m1 = 1, 2, . . . N1;m2 =
1, 2, . . . N2} for all n ∈ N+. Let φ0 : P0 → P1 and ψ0 : P0 → P1 be defined by φ0(X0m1,m2) := X1m1,m2
and ψ0(X0m1,m2) := {x1m1,m2} and, for any n ∈ N+, let φn : Pn → Pn+1 and ψn : Pn → Pn+1 be
defined by φn({xn′m1,m2}) := {xn
′
m1,m2} and ψn({xn
′
m1,m2}) := {xn
′
m1,m2} for all n′ ≤ n (n′ ∈ N+) and by
φn(Xnm1,m2) := X
n+1
m1,m2 and ψ
n(Xnm1,m2) := {xn+1m1,m2} (for allm1 = 1, 2, . . . N1, m2 = 1, 2, . . . N2). Define
Fn : P0 → Pn+1 by Fn := φn ◦ . . .◦φ0 for all n ∈ N. Trivially, Pn+1 both φn–refines and ψn–refines Pn;
moreover, Pn+1 Fn–refines P0 (for all n ∈ N). We now recursively define a sequence 〈un1 , . . . , unI 〉n∈N
of vectors of individual utility functions such that, for each n ∈ N and 1 ≤ i ≤ I, uni ∈ u(Pn). For
all even n ∈ N, let uni (Xnm1,m2) := vi(Xm1,m2) and, for all odd n ∈ N, let uni (Xnm1,m2) := wi(Xm1,m2)
(for all 1 ≤ i ≤ I, m1 = 1, 2, . . . N1, m2 = 1, 2, . . . N2). Finally, for any n, n′ ∈ N+ with n′ ≤ n,
let un+1i ({xn
′
m1,m2}) := uni ({xn
′
m1,m2}) and, for any n ∈ N, let un+1i ({xn+1m1,m2}) := uni (Xnm1,m2) (for all
1 ≤ i ≤ I, and 1 ≤ k ≤ 2I). Notice that, for any n ∈ N and 1 ≤ i ≤ I, we have not only (**)
uni = u
n+1
i ◦ ψn, but also (***) vi = u0i , vi = u2n+2i ◦ F 2n+1, and wi = u2n+1i ◦ F 2n. It can be shown by
induction that there is a sequence 〈Mn1 , . . . ,MnI 〉n∈N of vectors of individual decision–theoretic models
such that 〈M01 , . . . ,M0I 〉 = 〈M ′1, . . . ,M ′I〉 and, for all n ∈ N, 〈Mn1 , . . . ,MnI 〉 ∈ GS and, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ I,
P〈Mni 〉 = Pn, uMni = uni , F〈Mni 〉 ⊆ F〈Mn+1i 〉, pMni = p, GMni = G, (i) for all f ∈ F , PMn+1i ,f oneφn–
refines PMni ,f w.r.t. G, and (ii) for all f ∈ F〈Mni 〉 − F , PMn+1i ,f oneψn–refines PMni ,f w.r.t. G. Using
the transitivity of belief refinements (p. 3), Lemma A.2 and (i), we can show by induction that PMni ,f
oneFn–refines PM ′i ,f w.r.t. G for all f ∈ F , 1 ≤ i ≤ I, n ∈ N+. Applying Lemma A.3 to (***),
we find that G(PM2nk ,f , uM2nl ) = G(PM ′k,f , vl), G(PM2n+1k ,f , uM2n+1l ) = G(PM
′
k,f
, wl) and, by (*), both
VM2nkl (f) = VM∗∗kl (f) and VM2n+1kl (f) = VM††kl (f) (for all f ∈ F , n ∈ N, 1 ≤ k, l ≤ I).
We now show that Mn+1i refines M
n
i , for all n ∈ N and 1 ≤ i ≤ I. We need to show that
VMni (f) = VMn+1i (f) for all f ∈ F〈Mni 〉, 1 ≤ i ≤ I, n ∈ N. If f ∈ F , this follows from the fact that
VM2ni (f) = VM∗∗i (f) = VM††i (f) = VM2n+1i (f) (for and 1 ≤ i ≤ I, n ∈ N). If f ∈ F〈Mni 〉 − F , the claim
follows by applying Lemma A.3 to (ii) and (**). Next, if S is IIA and non–trivial, then we have, for any
n ∈ N, CS(〈M2ni 〉)(Y ) = CS(〈M∗∗i 〉)(Y ) and CS(〈M2n+1i 〉)(Y ) = CS(〈M††i 〉)(Y ) (for all Y ∈ F ). By (+’), we
then have g ∈ CS(〈M2ni 〉(X) but g /∈ CS(〈M2n+1i 〉(X) (for all n ∈ N). 
Theorem 3.2.1 Proof: Suppose that S is a robust social choice rule that has a wide domain and
is for models that are one–refinable. (Note that, for this part of the theorem, we do not require cross–
product refinability and invariance under relabelling.) Suppose furthermore that S is Pareto optimal. By
definition of a robust social choice rule, there exists 〈M∗i 〉 ∈ GS . Let p := p〈M∗i 〉, and G := G〈M∗i 〉. Let
p ∈ p(Γ). Since G is non–trivial, there are u, u′ ∈ u(Γ) such that G(p, u) > G(p, u′). Define a := u(Γ),
b := u′(Γ) and α := G(p, u), β := G(p, u′). We note that (*) for any Γ–partition P, any q ∈ p(P) that
refines p, any C ∈ P for which C is q,G–one and any va, vb ∈ u(P) with va(C) = a and ub(C) = b, we
have G(q, va) = α and G(q, vb) = β (by Lemma A.3). Next, we partition Γ into two at least countably
infinite sets Xk (k = 1, 2). For each k = 1, 2, we enumerate the elements of some countably infinite
subset of Xk in a sequence x1k, x
2
k, . . . , x
n
k , . . . (where x
n
k 6= xn
′
k for any n, n
′ ∈ N+). For all for all n ∈ N+
and k = 1, 2, let Xnk , Pn, Pnk , φn and ψn be defined as in Theorem 2.2. We now recursively define
a sequence 〈un1 , . . . , unI 〉n∈N+ of vectors of individual utility functions such that, for each n ∈ N+ and
1 ≤ i ≤ I, uni ∈ u(Pn). Let unj (C) := a for all C ∈ Pn, 2 ≤ j ≤ I, n ∈ N+. For all even n ∈ N+,
let un1 (X
n
1 ) := a and u
n
1 (X
n
2 ) := b. For all odd n ∈ N+, let un1 (Xn1 ) := b and un1 (Xn2 ) := a. Finally,
let u11({x11}) := u11({x12}) := a and, for any n, n′ ∈ N+ with n′ ≤ n, let un+11 ({xn
′
k }) := un1 ({xn
′
k }) and
un+11 ({xn+1k }) := un1 (Xnk ) (for k = 1, 2). As in Theorem 2.2, we have (**) uni = un+1i ◦ψn for any n ∈ N+
and 1 ≤ i ≤ I.
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By assumption, there are c, d ∈ Φ with c 6= d. It can be shown by induction that there is a
sequence 〈Mn1 , . . . ,MnI 〉n∈N+ of vectors of individual decision–theoretic models such that, for all n ∈ N+,
〈Mn1 , . . . ,MnI 〉 ∈ GS and, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ I and 2 ≤ j ≤ I, P〈Mni 〉 = Pn, uMni = uni , c, d ∈ F〈Mni 〉 ⊆
F〈Mn+1i 〉, p〈Mni 〉 = p, G〈Mni 〉 = G and (i) PM0i ,c refines p, {x
1
1} is c–one in M01 , X11 is c–one in M0j ,
PMn+1i ,c
oneφn–refines PMni ,c w.r.t. G (ii) PM0i ,d refines p, {x12} is d–one in M01 , X12 is d–one in M0j ,
PMn+1i ,d
oneφn–refines PMni ,d w.r.t. u, G and, finally, (iii) for all f ∈ F〈Mni 〉 − {c, d}, PMn+1i ,f oneψn–
refines PMni ,f w.r.t. G. Using Lemma A.2, we can show by induction that (i’) {x11} is c–one in Mn1 , Xn1 is
c–one in Mnj , (ii’) {x12} is d–one in Mn1 , Xn2 is d–one in Mnj and, trivially, (iii’) Γ is f–one in Mni (for all
n ∈ N+, 2 ≤ j ≤ I, 1 ≤ i ≤ I, f ∈ F〈Mni 〉). We now show that 〈Mn+1i 〉 refines 〈Mni 〉 for all n ∈ N+. We
need to show that G(PMni ,f , uMni ) = G(PMn+1i ,f , uMn+1i ) for all f ∈ F〈Mni 〉, 1 ≤ i ≤ I, n ∈ N
+. We note
that uMn1 ({x11}) = uMn+11 ({x
1
1}) = uMn+11 (φ
n({x11})) and uMnj (Xn1 ) = uMn+1j (X
n
1 ) = uMn+1j (φ
n(Xn1 ))
(1 ≤ i ≤ I, 2 ≤ j ≤ I, n ∈ N+) and similarly for d. On the other hand, (**) is relevant in case
f ∈ F〈Mni 〉 − {c, d}. The claim now follows by applying Lemma A.3 to (i)–(iii), (i’)–(iii’). By (*) and
the transitivity of belief refinements (p. 3), we find that (for all n ∈ N+, 1 ≤ k ≤ I, 2 ≤ j ≤ I)
VMnkj (c) = VMnkj (d) = α and VMn11(c) = VMn11(d) = α, while VM2nj1 (c) = α, VM2nj1 (d) = β, VM2n+1j1 (c) = β
and VM2n+1j1 (d) = α. By assumption α > β. If S is Pareto optimal, it follows that CS(〈M2ni 〉)({c, d}) = {c}
but CS(〈M2n+1i 〉)({c, d}) = {d} (for all n ∈ N
+). 
References
[1] M. Balch and P.C. Fishburn. Subjective expected utility theory for conditional prob-
abilities. In M. Balch, D.L. McFadden, and S.Y. Wu, editors, Essays on Economic
Bahavior under Uncertainty, pages 57–69, Amsterdam, 1974.
[2] S.H. Chew. A generalization of the quasilinear mean with applications to the mea-
surement of income inequality and decision theory resolving the Allais paradox.
Econometrica, 51:1065–92, 1983.
[3] W. Edwards. The prediction of decisions among bets. Journal of Experimental
Psychology, 50:201–214, 1955.
[4] P.C. Fishburn. Decision and Value Theory. New York, 1964.
[5] P.C. Fishburn. Utility Theory for Decision Making. Wiley, New York, 1970.
[6] P.C. Fishburn. Transitive measurable utility. Journal of Economic Theory, 31:293–
317, 1983.
[7] P.C. Fishburn. Nonlinear Preference and Utility Theory. Johns Hopkins University,
Baltimore, 1988.
[8] I. Gilboa. Expected utility with purely subjective non–additive probabilities. Journal
of Mathematical Economics, 16:65–88, 1987.
[9] M. Hild. Stable aggregation of preferences. California Institute of Technology, Social
Science Working Paper, 1112, 2001a. Available at www.hild.org.
15
[10] M. Hild. The instability of robust aggregation. California Institute of Technology,
Social Science Working Paper, 1113, 2001b. Available at www.hild.org.
[11] D. Kahneman and A. Tversky. Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk.
Econometrica, 47:263–91, 1979.
[12] U.S. Karmarkar. Subjectively weighted utility: A descriptive extension of the ex-
pected utility model. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 21:61–72,
1978.
[13] I. Levi. Pareto unanimity and consensus. Journal of Philosophy, 87:481–492, 1990.
[14] G. Loomes and R. Sugden. Regret theory: An alternative theory of rational choice
under uncertainty. The Economic Journal, 92:805–824, 1982.
[15] M.J. Machina. “Expected utility” analysis without the independence axiom. Econo-
metrica, 50:277–323, 1982b.
[16] C. Plott. Axiomatic social choice theory: An overview and interpretation. American
Journal of Political Science, 20:511–596, 1976.
[17] D. Schmeidler. Subjective probability and expected utility without additivity.
Econometrica, 57:571–587, 1989.
16
